Within this apologetic level we want to call attention to the need to remain consistent in apologetic strategies.
Here we touch base with the discipline of epistemology. A major divide with respect to epistemic 
justification is between “internalists” and “externalists." It’s important to understand this divide in order to keep your apologetic strategies and answers consistent within themselves.
EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM
In a rough and ready way, the former of the two views mentioned above has to do with the claim that’s one’s justification for a belief is within one’s power or access to form properly. This has been described as a way of thinking about epistemic justification that has to do with one doing their epistemic duty (deontology) to form one’s beliefs in a rational way; that is, we have a rational (almost ethical) duty to form beliefs properly. It holds that the necessary grounds for justification is within one’s direct access; thus one has the ability to form a particular belief properly.
Setting aside for the time being as to whether there is a logical entailing relationship between epistemic internalism and apologetic evidentialism, we nearly aways find associated with that epistemic position an apologetic strategy that could be called evidentialism (or evidentialism überhaupt or generic evidentialism). Let me explain. Evidentialism is the view that one must have a belief and a sufficient amount of evidence for that belief--and the evidence must properly related to the conclusion for that belief. Sometimes a Humean add on for this position is that one must apportion the strength of that belief according to the strength of evidence for that belief.
Gettier problems are often cited as counter-examples to the supposed deontological way of forming beliefs (in this context), because one can have a belief, it can be a true belief but for reasons not having to do with a failure of doing one’s duty epistemically, one can have false justification or false grounds for holding that particular belief. This possiblity of having a lack of relatedness between one’s true beliefs and the proper justification for that true belief creates a problem for those who wish to call those beliefs (evidentially) justified true beliefs. What is usually cited in these sorts of cases is something the person is unaware of that makes the belief true, and at the same time what that person holds to be the proper justification for the belief is in fact unreliable in that situation.
Though the dependence in evidentialism in apologetics is to the internalist epistemic account, it is often not explicitly stated; rather it tends to be assumed in the methodology. All well and good, but then you can ask whether this strategy is the proper one for apologists to use and if you do use it, you need to stay consistent within it.
EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM
By way of contrast, the epistemic externalists hold that belief formation is often not within our capacity to form in a deontological (dutiful) way. In this view, some of the necessary grounds for justification lay beyond our direct control (e.g. try to believe it is true you are now standing on the moon) and thus we cannot be held completely responsible for some of the beliefs we hold.
Associated with the position of epistemic externalism is a subview called epistemic reliabilism--roughly the view that to form beliefs properly one must have a reliable means or module for forming that belief) and proper functionalists (to form beliefs properly one’s brain/mind must be functioning properly--as it was designed to function in an environment that is conducive to that design plan).
Apologetically associated with this epistemic position are the 1) so-called “presupptionalists” and 2) apologists that argue that certain foundational beliefs often called properly basic beliefs, are justifiable in certain contexts without any propositional evidence.
Let me unpack that some: presuppositionalists often argue along these lines: 1) everyone must start with presuppositions, and by their nature they cannot be justified by anything else; we have ours and “they” have theirs. But, they hold that they’re just as entitled to theirs as others because neither can muster non-circular arguments in their defense..
As suggested above, other apologists who opt for externalism, for instance, the “properly basic belief” folk argue that their starting points are not considered to be gratuitous beliefs, but rather beliefs that are grounded in certain epistemic situations which are appropriate for forming those beliefs. An example of that would be forming the belief that “God disapproves of what I just did” in a certain situation
This grounding of beliefs in things outside of one’s direct control (like whether one’s mind is functioning properly or not) is what is part and parcel of the epistemic externalists.
SO WHAT?
The thing to see here regarding epistemic consistency is that if you adopt the properly basic belief approach to apologetics (grounded in epistemic externalism), you would want to, in the way you do apologetics, stay consistent with that by either eschewing evidentialism or by endorsing it in a qualified way. The same would be true, with the relevant changes, if you held to an evidentialist approach. For the sake of consistency, you would avoid the basic belief and pressupositional approach to apologetics, unless it was in some qualified way. To get a better handle on this, we advise taking a look at this book:
Cowan, Steven B. & Gundry, Stanley N. eds. Five Views on Apologetics. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000. pps. 381.
Annotation: Provides an opportunity to examine side by side five ways apologetics are “done,” including: The Classical Method, The Evidential Method, The Cummulative Case Method, The Presuppositional Method, and the Reformed Epistemological Method. A great starting point for understanding systems of apologetics.
Each section is written by a proponent of a different view of apologetics and includes responses from the other contributors as well as a closing statement by each contributor. Some folks get boggled by the hard work it takes to read each section thoughtfully and sympathetically, but I don’t know a short cut around this.